Introduction
The law governing nineteenth century disputes at sea over whales claimed by competing vessels remains largely unexamined. Yet, the handful of matters litigated in Anglo-American courts have been cited repeatedly to advance various arguments about how property law is created. Is property law produced by legislators and judges or does it develop from the practices and customs of involved individuals? Robert C. Ellickson, has argued that whalemen developed norms to settle arguments over contested whales. These norms, Ellickson explained, were largely adopted by courts as the property law of whaling. Ellickson's point is that whaling norms "did not mimic law; they created law." Legal scholars have generally accepted Ellickson's understanding that "judges regarded themselves as bound to honor whalers' usages that had been proved at court." Henry E. Smith has, for example, recently cited Ellickson's discussion of whaling norms as evidence of the judicial tendency in property disputes to accept "wholesale the customs developed by communities that stand in a special relationship to use conflicts." 1 Ellickson is certainly correct that the close-knit community of nineteenth century American whalemen managed to settle disputes in ways which maximized group welfare. What Ellickson has failed to recognize is that that the means by which whalemen resolved disputes without violence or frequent involvement of courts was built not upon widely accepted norms, but rather upon the application of some rather general maxims that were often poorly understood even by experienced captains and crews. Whaling disputes were, in fact, most often settled through compromises grounded in inchoate notions of what constituted honorable behavior arising out of the particular situation and parties involved.
That whaling practices would appear to Ellickson and other legal scholars as fairly well established is not surprising. The academic understanding of how whalemen resolved disputes is gleaned almost entirely from a dozen or so Anglo-American judicial opinions. In seeking to settle the cases at bar, judges drafted opinions that suggested a level of agreement among whalemen as to prevailing norms that never existed at sea. This scholarly acceptance that judges accurately stated whaling customs explains the mistaken belief that whalemen -as Ellickson and Smith assert -created the American property law of whaling. Instead, judges and the lawyers who represented ship owners were to a large degree responsible for creating much of what came to be memorialized in legal treatises by the end of the nineteenth century as the property law of whaling.
While the legal profession of the nineteenth century did much to obscure actual whaling customs, it has been the misreading of Herman Melville's discussion of whaling law in Moby-Dick that has enshrined the idea in the minds of most historians that whalemen avoided litigation and violence by a strict adherence to universally accepted norms. Melville proclaimed that without such universal laws "vexatious and violent disputes" would frequently arise between ships claiming ownership of a whale. The rule followed by all American whalemen, Melville explained, was dubbed fast-fish, loose-fish and awarded the prize to the first ship to attach a harpoon which remained affixed to a whale and connected to a rope in control of the crew at the moment the whale died.
Having proclaimed the universality of this rule, Melville proceeded to introduce two additional standards which whalemen, on occasion, also honored. The practice of iron holds the whale honored a ship's right to a whale even if its harpoon had drawn loose or its line had snapped so long as the vessel remained in pursuit with reasonable prospects of killing the animal. Melville also explained that a standard of fairness was sometimes invoked when an application of the other rules would dictate an unfair result.
Legal scholars and whaling historians have largely deferred to Melville's expertise and accepted his statement that whaling laws were universal without recognizing that his explication of these practices revealed the jumble of competing rules followed at sea. A close examination of two of the five whaling disputes from the Sea of Okhotsk that were litigated in the nineteenth century reveals the vagaries of whaling norms and the problems in using judicial opinions to recover such practices. In Heppingstone v.
Mammen, it is impossible to draw from the testimony of crew members and expert witnesses anything resembling a norm upon which battles over contested whales could be resolved at sea or in court. Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 (1872) . For a discussion of how judges and lawyers in England and Scotland had much to do with the development of British whaling law, see Robert C. Deal, Fast-Fish, LooseFish: How Whalemen, Lawyers, and Judges Created the British Property Law of Whaling, 37 Ecology L.Q. 199 (2010) .
American merchants in Hawaii started to bring commercial disputes before the local courts. The burgeoning western influence is reflected in the speed with which the Hawaiian legal system largely adopted American commercial law during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. Therefore, in 1863, when American whaling captain John Heppingstone fell into a dispute with John Mammen, the master of the German whaler Oregon, concerning a bowhead killed near Jonas Island in the Sea of Okhotsk the Supreme Court of Hawaii provided a logical forum for his action seeking recovery of the contested cetacean. The Supreme Court of Hawaii permitted a speedy resolution of the dispute while observing a body of laws that would have been, in substantial part, familiar to any lawyer standing before the federal bench in Boston. 4 On 29 May 1863, boats belonging to the Oregon spotted a whale and gave chase. They succeeded in striking the bowhead and for the next two hours were dragged by the whale through floating ice. The Oregon was forced to cut its line when the whale disappeared beneath thick ice. When the whale unexpectedly rose again a few minutes later, one of the Oregon's boats again managed to strike and attach itself to the bowhead. That boat was stoved, but three other boats took up the chase and secured lines to the whale. Another boat was stoved and a second crew cut loose to pull their comrades out of the water. Hawai'i's Nearshore Fisheries, 10 APLPJ 235 (2008). loose and the whale disappeared. Confidant that the whale -spouting thick blood from the combination of hand and bomb lance strikes -was seriously injured, the Oregon decided to remain in the vicinity and renew the hunt at daybreak. To track the currents and hopefully signal the location of the whale they expected to expire during the night, a crew attached a waif pole to a block of floating ice. 5 With daylight, the waif was recovered, but the whale had disappeared. The
Oregon was left with little option but to sail in the direction which the bowhead likely made its surprising escape. Heavy fog which limited visibility to less than a mile lifted by about 9:00 AM and mate Antoine Costa went aloft with a spyglass to survey the water. After an hour, Costa finally spied a whale at a distance of about two to three miles with what appeared to be harpoons in its back. The whale, however, was not alone. Captain John Heppinstone's bark, the Richmond, was, at a mile and a half or so from the whale, also visible through the spyglass lowering its boats. Captain Mammen sent three boats to join the chase for what he assumed to be his bowhead. Costa was also ordered to inform the Richmond that the whale belonged to the Oregon and request that they desist in their attempts to take the animal. A hand lance has a wide blade attached to a wooden pole used to kill a whale. Bomb lances came into use after about 1850 and were shot at the whale from a shoulder gun. Having penetrated the whale, a delayed charge exploded. While an obvious improvement in that they could be fired with accuracy from up to about sixty feet from the target, bomb lances were extremely dangerous to use. John R. Bockstoce, Whales, Ice, and Men: The History of Whaling in the Western Arctic 62-64 (1986 opinion that the evidence showed that the captain of the Richmond had, indeed, said something to this effect. With several ships in the vicinity, Heppingstone perhaps felt that Costa was mistaken or was attempting to trick the Richmond into breaking off its pursuit. Once the whale was killed, Heppingstone suggested, as a compromise, that they "go halves." Costa insisted, however, that the matter be resolved by cutting the irons out of the whale. When the first iron proved to be unmarked, Heppinstone proclaimed "ah, you havent got that whale yet and you shant have that iron." The second iron bore the marks of a third ship. Heppingstone was not convinced by the explanation that the Oregon had acquired the irons from the other vessel and repeated his taunt that his rival had not demonstrated its right to the whale. Costa insisted, despite Heppingstone's reluctance, that a third iron be removed. Heppingstone cut out another iron, glanced at the marking, covered it with his hand, and proposed three times "what do you say halves." Horace Allen, the Oregon's third mate, looked at the iron and announced that it belonged to his ship. Heppingstone proclaimed that he did not know if by law he was entitled to half the whale, but that for all his trouble he should be granted a share. 8 When Costa indicated that it was not for him to decide, Heppingstone prepared to board the Oregon, calling Captain Mammen "a damned Dutchman" and declaring that most American ships would willingly share the whale. Heppingstone's parting comment was that "if the captain is not man enough to give me half of it I would just as have tell him to kiss my arse as not." Negotiations on board the Oregon ended with Mammen refusing Heppingstone's request and the latter's declaration that the matter would be revisited when they returned to Hawaii. 9 The bargaining continued in Honolulu on the day after the Oregon returned to port. On 14 November 1863, Mammen and Heppingstone met in the store of Captain P. S. Wilcox. It appears from Mammen's testimony that Wilcox, who served at trial as an expert witness for the Richmond, was attempting to mediate the dispute on Heppingstone's behalf. Wilcox asked Mammen if there was some sort of settlement that could be reached that would save the expenses of litigation. Mammen was adamant that he would not be a part of any arrangement that would divide possession of the whale. Declaring that he was through dealing with Mammen, Wilcox asked the Oregon's captain for the name of the ship's agent. Mammen proclaimed that if the agent, Mr. Thomas, "gave a drop of oil from that whale," he would resign his position.
Whether Wilcox pursued the matter with Thomas is unknown. 10 A couple of weeks later, Heppingstone testified at trial that he knew of no custom governing a whale that is struck by one ship and then killed by another vessel. He did indicate, however, that if he saw that the first striker remained in pursuit of a whale bearing three of its irons he would not join the hunt. Heppingstone suggested that the Oregon -rather than making a verbal claim -should have attempted to kill the disputed bowhead which, prior to its slaying, was free for the taking. If Heppingstone seemed to advocate iron holds the whale as advisory and, in any event, applicable only when the first striker was clearly in pursuit of a whale struck several times, Captain Wilcox presented on Heppingstone's behalf a strict version of fast-fish, loose-fish. There exists, Wilcox explained, no rule to prevent the party that kills a whale from claiming it.
Wilcox indicated that it was common to kill and unremarkable to claim a bowhead wounded the previous day by another ship. Third mate Jonathan Rogers of the Richmond opined that pursuit of a wounded whale with attached irons holds the animal, but that in the absence of such pursuit the prize was commonly shared. When Heppingstone boarded the Oregon to speak with Captain Mammen, Rogers expected that the whale would be divided as "the practice is to give half without any grumbling where I have been." Captain Thomas Williams -an expert witness called by the Richmond -provided a particularly convoluted explanation of the applicable customs.
He declared that a ship that strikes a whale, but claims it the following day is only entitled to the return of its craft from the slayer. While a first striker's claim to a whale struck the previous day is more compelling if he warned the second vessel of his claim before the latter affixed its first harpoon, the slayer is still entitled to the whale if he was the first to lower his boats. The outcome would be different, in Williams' estimation, if the two ships lowered about the same time. In that scenario, the whale should be divided. 11
The Oregon's sole expert witness, Captain F. W. Wilbur, stated that there is no custom or usage that prevents the first striker from claiming a whale bearing the ship's irons. Wilbur revealed how his ship once willingly relinquished a whale it had killed when another vessel made a claim based on its affixed irons. "It is," Wilbur intoned, "customary with me to give up any thing that belongs to another man." Wilbur concluded his testimony with the apparent caveat that he had stated the custom among If these witnesses expressed divergent views and, perhaps, even doubt as to the existence of custom concerning living whales, they were unanimous in describing practices regarding dead cetaceans. Heppingstone, Wilcox, Rogers, and Williams stated with great certainty that a discovered whale carcass is split between the finder and a claimant whose irons remain affixed. Wilcox explained that "there is a distinction between a dead and a live whale on the whaling grounds. If I picked up a dead whale I would have held on to all I had cut in and let the balance below the plankshear go to the person who claimed it. If I had cut in the whole whale I could keep the whole whale." 14 Upon the conclusion of testimony, counsel for Heppingstone argued that the matter should be resolved by application of the common law doctrine of ferae naturae.
Two cases from the Supreme Court of Judicature of New York were cited for the proposition that property in a wild animal is acquired by occupancy. In Buster v.
Newkirk, a hunter was said to occupy -or possess -a deer if he deprived it of its "natural liberty" by bringing the animal within his "power and control." The facts in Buster were, as Heppingstone's counsel likely argued, particularly on point with the case at bar. The deer was wounded but managed to run off with Newkirk, the hunter, in pursuit. Although darkness forced Newkirk to temporarily abandon the chase, his dogs continued on the trail of the bleeding deer. During the night, a third party fired and struck the deer which, with one of Newkirk's persistent hounds closing in, ran onto the property of Buster. The deer's six mile dash for safety ended when Buster slit its throat.
With the morning light, Newkirk resumed pursuit which ended at Buster's home with a rebuffed claim of the hide. The court ruled that the abandoned pursuit and the ability of the deer to run six miles after being wounded demonstrated that Newkirk had not of bees does not constitute possession. It is the hiving of the bees which reduces the insects to private property. 15 Mammen countered that as his voluntary abandonment of the chase was necessitated by the exigency of saving his crew, the court should deem his pursuit of the whale continuous. The Oregon, having inflicted a serious injury the previous day, was able to overtake the whale prior to the first strike of the Richmond and would have certainly killed its prey were it not for the interference of Heppingstone's vessel. The warning provided to Heppingstone that the whale belonged to the Oregon, in addition, placed the Richmond on notice that any actions taken in pursuit of the whale would be on Mammen's behalf. The remainder of Mammen's arguments asserted that Heppingstone's claim on the whale should be estopped by his statements and actions at sea. Mammen argued that prior to removing the harpoons Heppingstone conceded that the whale belonged to the Oregon should the irons bear its mark. Heppingstone's decision to allow the Oregon to render the bowhead was, in Mammen's estimation, a clear indication that he recognized that the whale belonged to the Oregon. Mammen further contended that any recovery by Heppingstone be limited to the one half of the whale's value he claimed in the heat of the dispute. 16 Presented with a common law governing wild animals that was far from settled A wounded whale belongs to its slayer if that ship lowers and kills the animal before the first striker joins in the pursuit. While Robertson's explanation of whaling norms as to a dead whale was supported by the evidence adduced at trial, his declaration of a custom governing living whales was not. 17 The problem in the case at bar was, as Robertson explained, that the Richmond was placed on notice prior to striking the bowhead that the Oregon claimed the whale based upon an identification of the affixed harpoons. The Oregon was, in addition, also in position at the time of its claim to take the whale. Although Robertson acknowledged that testimony was presented that even under these complicating circumstances the custom followed by American whalemen would award the whale to the Richmond, the 17 Opinion, Trial Transcript, Heppingstone v. Mammen, Admiralty #56, HSA. Heppingstone v. Mammen, 2 Hawaii 707, 711. There is some evidence that the lowering of the first boat was, on occasion, used to determine which ship was entitled to a whale. John Bockstoce believes that whalemen in the Western Arctic agreed to honor the claim of the ship which was able to put the first boat into the water. Bockstoce, Whales, Ice, and Men, supra note 5 at 61. Ellickson has rightly questioned Bockstoce's reliance on a single childhood memory recorded many years later. Ellickson, Order without Law, supra note 1, at 196. justice explained that he found such a usage unreasonable. Perhaps, Robertson's disinclination to follow this usage was a reflection of his unease at the degree to which it was the product of his own selective reading of the testimony. At this point, Robertson moved from custom and the common law as modified by usage and turned to fairness. 18 To explain why he found a custom that would give the entire whale to the At about 9:00 on the evening of 1 August 1867, George Silvey -second mate of the Hercules -was below deck when the call went out to lower the boats. It was still light in the North East Gulf of the Sea of Okhotsk as the crew scrambled to pursue a spouting whale spied moving quickly in the direction of the Hercules. The boat commanded by Silvey managed to cut the whale off, but the bowhead sounded and remained under water for the next twenty to thirty minutes. When the whale surfaced at a distance of about a half-mile, Silvey was able to quickly close the gap and affix a harpoon. The injured bowhead ran off with iron and rope still attached. It was at a distance of more than two miles and sixty to ninety minutes before Silvey's boat hauled 20 Ellickson cites Mammen and Swift for the proposition that cutting in was used to measure the timeliness of a first striker's claim in disputes involving whales chased by two ships. Ellickson, Order Without Law, supra note 1, at 200. up close enough to -with the assistance of other boats from the Hercules -administer the fatal lance jabs. As the whale neared death, Captain Nehemiah Baker of the Rainbow approached in a boat and claimed the bowhead. Baker explained that the Rainbow had struck the whale a short time before and that it had escaped with the affixed harpoon and about two hundred fathoms of line. Although Silvey had noticed an additional rope about the whale, he had not realized that it was connected to a harpoon.
The whale, with death, rolled up revealing an iron. Removed at Baker's request, the harpoon bore the Rainbow's mark. 21 The negotiations that attended so many confrontations at sea over whales commenced with Baker's claim and Hercules first mate George Manchester declining to state a position. Manchester indicated that he would leave the discussion to his captain, Isaac C. Howland, who was on board the nearby Hercules. It was agreed that Baker would take possession of the whale while Howland was consulted. Dissatisfied with this arrangement, Silvey was not reluctant to express his opinion as to the proper disposition of the whale. He argued with Baker and perhaps his own first mate that the whale should be evenly divided between the ships. When Captain Howland arrived on the scene about a half hour later, he took up Silvey's position. Howland explained to Baker that his officers claimed one half of the whale as the Hercules had foregone 21 Depositions of George Silvey and Robert D. Gifford, Case File, Swift v. Gifford, United States District Court, Massachusetts, March, 1872, United States National Archives, Northeast Region, Waltham, Massachusetts (National Archives, Northeast Region). Silvey's name is also spelled Silvia and Sylvia. Silvey has been used throughout as that is the spelling used by the notary who took his deposition. The material in the case file from which to reconstruct the facts in the dispute is limited to the depositions of Silvey and Gifford and the pleadings. As Silvey and Gifford were both mates on the Hercules, the Rainbow's version of the events must be gleaned from its answer to the libel. Pleadings are not always particularly helpful in determining what happened at sea. In whaling cases they were frequently drawn up by attorneys after discussing the matter with owners who were not present at the dispute. In some cases, such as the libel in Swift v. Gifford, pleadings were filed prior to return of a vessel to Massachusetts. pursuit of another whale in taking the subject of the present dispute. In addition, Howland asserted, the Rainbow would not have been able to catch up with the whale but for the intervention of the Hercules. The Hercules had, in effect, done Baker a favor in returning to him his iron and line which would otherwise have been lost in the side of a whale quickly moving into the protection of a darkening sky. Baker was apparently not moved by Howland's argument and the captains agreed to let their owners decide the matter at a later date. 22 The owners of the Hercules, the New Bedford firm of Swift & Perry, were obviously not satisfied by their discussions with Charles Gifford, the principal investor in law" as to whether "fresh pursuit" combined with a reasonable prospect of ultimately capturing the animal was sufficient. If Lowell followed the stricter interpretation of ferae naturae, the Hercules would clearly prevail. If, on the other hand, Lowell believed that the case must turn on the likelihood that the Rainbow would -without the actions of its competitor -have taken the whale, the Hercules produced compelling evidence that without its intervention the animal would have escaped. Silvey testified that the Rainbow was at a distance of about eight miles when he struck the whale. Even Gifford conceded in his answer to the complaint that the Rainbow, while still in pursuit, was about six miles from Silvey's boat. That Dodge and Bonney directed their argument and testimony at this issue was confirmed by the editor of the reported opinion who observed that the only issue contested at trial concerned the prospects of the Rainbow catching up to the fleeing whale. 25 Instead of applying the common law, Lowell, however, abruptly turned to the customs of whaling and -in the process -made a remarkable admission. Lowell revealed that he did not pursue the common law for the simple reason that it would be impossible to determine whether the Rainbow "though continuing the chase, had more than a possibility of success." It appears that Lowell abandoned what he suggested to be the governing law for the simple reason that it would be difficult to apply to the facts at bar. Judges are, of course, frequently faced with facts that -when applied to the pertinent standard -do not suggest an easy resolution to the dispute. The proper solution in such a situation would be to find that in the absence of evidence that the Rainbow would have caught up to the whale, the animal must be awarded to the Hercules. In abandoning the common law, Lowell took note of Story's concern that customs would unsettle established legal principles, but determined that the application of whaling usage posed no such danger. Whaling practices, Lowell explained, were limited to such a discreet industry and too particular to attract and confuse those engaged in other branches of commerce. Adherence to whaling custom rather than the laws of a particular nation would -as Judge Chambre stated in an oft cited portion of the 1807 British case of Fennings v. Lord Grenville -prevent confrontations at sea between whalemen hailing from around the world. 26 In turning to custom to decide the case, Lowell did not, however, apply the usage which Bonney had -on behalf of the Hercules -agreed would be testified to by competent witnesses. Bonney stipulated that such witnesses would establish that a whale that escapes with the harpoon of a ship and is subsequently killed by another vessel belongs -at least in part -to the first striker if it claims the animal "before it is fully cut in by the second ship." While the stipulation stated that it applied to a live whale pursued by two ships, Lowell correctly recognized that the custom that honored a claim made prior to completion of the cutting in process pertained exclusively to dead whales found adrift in the water. As Lowell explained, a dead whale drifting in the current belongs to the finder so long as it can be cut in prior to a claim being made by the ship whose harpoon the cetacean bears. That Lowell viewed this as a separate, but certainly related, custom was indicated by his use of the word contrary to describe its relationship to the rule that iron holds a living whale. Ignoring the stipulated custom, Lowell, instead, proclaimed the applicable usage for a living whale to be "that he who first strikes it so effectually that the iron remains fast should have the better right, the pursuit still continuing, . . ." The source for this custom was the oral decision rendered by Judge Sprague in the 1863 matter of Bourne v. Ashley. While counsel for the Hercules argued that the failure of the Bourne decision to be published was likely the product of Sprague's dissatisfaction with its contents, the real reason may well have been that it was never reduced to writing. Lowell indicated that his source for the opinion were the notes taken by one of the attorneys in the matter. Having assured the parties that he had examined the Bourne case file and found the purported opinion to be consistent with its contents, Lowell determined that the Rainbow had maintained pursuit and should be awarded the whale. 27 The case of Swift v. Gifford captures, in many respects, the vagaries of whaling custom and the twisted application of those practices in the courtroom. This disconnect between practices at sea and how they were used in court was demonstrated by the conflation of the different approaches governing live and dead whales. While whalemen harbored many different ideas about what constituted possession of a live whale -as the discussion of Heppingstone v. Mammen demonstrates -the custom concerning a harpooned dead whale was, by whaling standards, well settled at sea. It was generally understood that a ship which discovered a dead whale bearing the harpoon of another vessel was entitled to as much as it could cut in prior to a claim being made by the first striker. It was this custom that was extended by the expert witness and counsel in Swift to living whales. This broadening of the usage concerning dead whales appears novel and marks a clear departure from accepted practices. Even Judge Lowell chose to ignore this standard -despite of the stipulation of counsel -and followed a version of iron holds the whale that preserved the rights of the first striker so long as they maintained pursuit of their catch.
Francis Allyn Olmsted's 1841 account of a whaling trip to the Pacific is typical in limiting cutting in as a test for timeliness to dead whales. As Olmstead revealed, the assumption was that a dead whale had been mortally wounded by the boat that 27 Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558. Bourne v. Ashley, 3 F. Cas. 1002 (D. Mass. 1863 . attached a harpoon. The slayer was entitled to the whale pursuant to iron holds the whale, but only if he was able to make his claim before the whale was cut in. This version of iron holds the whale as applied to dead whales protected the slayer who was able to quickly find its prey and it increased the likelihood of harvesting should the whale -as frequently happened -succumb to its wounds at some distance from the boat that dealt the fatal blows. Research to date has yet to discover a single use of the cutting in test for the timeliness of a claim applied to a living whale pursued by two ships. 28 The decision of counsel for the Hercules to agree that competent witnesses would testify that cutting in marked the time within which a first striker must claim a whale killed by another vessel was, as previously indicated, likely made with little attention to the particulars of the stipulated custom. The strategy of Dodge and Bonney was, instead, to convince Judge Lowell that he must follow the common law of ferae naturae and not custom in rendering a decision. It is also probable that presented with a single expert witness who would testify as to the custom, counsel -believing Captain Pierce's testimony as to the universality of this usage -saw no grounds for challenging his expertise. In accepting Pierce's testimony, Dodge and Bonney contributed to an ongoing misunderstanding of whaling custom still evident in current explanations of nineteenth century practices. It was, however, the obscure structure and reasoning of Lowell's opinion that must bear most of the blame for the subsequent confusion as to the holding in Swift. Almost immediately, legal commentators incorrectly interpreted Lowell's ruling as measuring the timeliness of a first striker's claim by the point at which the eventual slayer cuts into a whale. In his 1881 The Common Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. cited Swift for the proposition that American whalemen plying the Arctic Ocean award "a whale to the vessel whose iron first remains in it, provided claim be made before cutting in." Lost in Holmes' account was Lowell's holding that continuing pursuit -however that may be measured -was determinative of the rights of a ship that struck then lost a whale that was ultimately killed by another vessel. While cutting in might have been a reasonable and convenient measure of continued pursuit, whalemen do not appear to have employed this test. 29 Subsequent scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries largely followed Holmes in conflating the customs for pursuit of living whales with that for carcasses discovered adrift in the water. The influence and importance of Holmes as an interpreter of the common law may well have led other commentators to simply repeat the justice's assessment of Swift without further consideration of the case. In 1887, British barrister Whitley Stokes, for example, quoted Holmes -but not Swift -for the proposition that whalemen honored the claim of a first striker made before cutting in.
Stokes' discussion was also one of the earliest declarations that American judges such as Lowell followed industry custom in deciding whaling property disputes. As with most analyses of whaling cases, Stokes correctly noted that custom, not common law, was used to settle conflicts over contested whales. Stokes was, however, also typical in misconstruing the custom used and, most importantly, accepting the statement of that usage as set forth in the judge's opinion as an accurate assessment of how whalemen operated at sea. Recent scholars have largely followed Holmes in accepting cutting in 29 Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 . Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 212 (1881).
as the test for timeliness when two ships pursued a live whale. Robert Ellickson, whose interpretation of nineteenth century American whaling custom has been uniformly accepted, offers the stipulation of counsel in Swift as evidence for the now venerablebut inaccurate -position that a form of iron holds the whale which employed the cutting in test for timeliness of a claim was followed in the Sea of Okhotsk. 30 
Conclusion
Evidence of the negotiations in whaling disputes at sea and on land has survived primarily from matters that were litigated. There is no way to know to what degree such bargaining was common. The testimony in Heppingstone certainly suggests that it was. Various crew members and expert witnesses provided their understanding of the prevailing customs of whaling. They expressed such uncertainty as to the governing norms and provided such a welter of conflicting standards that it seems that ambiguity was the sole constant. Beyond a general statement that in certain circumstances an affixed iron in an injured whale might preserve some rights in the first striker, it is difficult to draw anything resembling a rule. In an atmosphere where whalemen appeared, at times, to be making things up as they went along, it is hard to imagine that such negotiations were not an accepted practice.
The evidence in Heppingstone and Swift also suggest that these negotiations were not, strictly speaking, exclusively about applicable customs, norms, or usages.
When Heppingstone stated at sea that he believed that he was entitled to a share of the whale for his trouble, he acknowledged that his claim was not based upon law or custom. Similarly, in court, Heppingstone indicated that he was not aware of any custom governing the situation. The belief of Richmond mate Jonathan Rogers that the Oregon would readily hand over half the whale without complaint was also based on fairness. Heppingstone's sense that effort should be rewarded -even in the absence of a compelling claim based on industry custom -was shared by Silvey and Captain Howland in Swift. Silvey and Howland argued that the Hercules should be granted half the whale as compensation for its decision to forego another whale and kill a bowhead they had no reason to believe belonged to another vessel. As with the arguments of Heppingstone and Rogers, principles of fairness -not custom -animated the claims of Silvey and Howland. The sense that each of these whalemen was referring to a code of conduct or way of measuring rights to a disputed cetacean that was as much personal as it was communal was captured in the testimony of Captain Wilbur. "It is," Wilbur testified in Heppingstone, "customary with me to give up any thing that belongs to another man." 31 The terms custom, norm, and usage are often used somewhat interchangeably throughout the voluminous literature discussing socially approved behavior that is created and enforced outside the dictates and formal institutions of the state. Legal scholars, however, generally use the word norm when they attempt to rigorously define and examine the concept of rules of conduct that originate with participants in the involved business or community. While the offered definitions of a norm varies, the salient point in all characterizations of the concept is that a norm is not recognized as binding positive law. As legal scholar Lawrence Mitchell has observed, a norm is an "ought statement." "Norms," Mitchell explains, "tell us what we should do under a given set of circumstances and are therefore obligatory upon those who wish to participate in the society which is at least partly constituted by such norms." Norms, of course, are not the only force that molds, directs, and coerces human behavior. Some people operate under a set of personal ethics which are self enforced by that individual's desire to act in a way he or she deems proper. A self imposed code may be barely distinguishable from prevailing norms in the surrounding society or it may be highly idiosyncratic. 32 What distinguishes norms in the scholarly literature from personal ethics is that members of the community understand what behavior a norm requires. Absent such an understanding, a norm will not -at least in theory -function efficiently. The enforcement mechanism of a norm will break down if community members can not agree as to the sort of behavior to punish. In the case of nineteenth century whaling in the Sea of Okhotsk, the rules concerning dead whales discovered adrift were clearly norms. Whalemen were able to provide consistent statements as to who was entitled to a dead cetacean. The norm even provided a rather precise means for determining the percentage of the whale to be awarded based on the progress of the cutting in process at the time the claim was made. A captain who violated the norm for dead whales did so with the clear knowledge that he risked his good standing in the community of whalemen. The provisions governing live whales bearing the irons of a competing vessel were not, however, so easily expressed. As the testimony in Swift and which were a mix of Christianity's Golden Rule and the captain's individual notion of proper behavior. 34 Yet, if whaling practices in the Sea of Okhotsk were confusing and not well understood by the men who hunted cetaceans, why were they so remarkably successful in keeping disputes out of court? The answer is likely multifaceted. The transaction costs of litigation were exceptionally high both in terms of the price of bringing or defending a cause of action and in the amount of time required before a verdict would be rendered. Compromise -given the high transaction costs and the unwillingness to engage in violent forms of self help -also made good economic and business sense.
Whalemen had, in addition, a long history of sharing whales. When Heppingstone suggested to the mate of the Oregon that they "go halves" he echoed a tradition that included seventeenth century reguations for splitting drift whales, the late eighteenth century Galapagos custom of dividing whales between first striker and slayer, eighteenth century New England usage of awarding a fractional share to a competitor who answered the call for assistance, and the widespread practice of mateship.
Ellickson is undoubtedly correct in insisting that close knit communities are often capable of managing their affairs without recourse to courts and other formal manifestations of the law. What he overestimates is the necessity for well understood norms in settling disputes. Whalemen in the Sea of Okhotsk proved adept at resolving controversies on a common sense, ad hoc basis without universal norms. The close
